By Joseph L. Noga, Michael W. Ross, Justin C. Steffen and Kashan Pathan

Since its inception, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB”) has faced controversy over its structure as an independent agency headed by a single director who can be removed by the President only for cause. Critics have invoked the unitary executive theory to argue that the Constitution permits an agency to enjoy independence from at-will termination by the President only if the agency is headed by multiple commissioners, directors, or board members.[1] About six months ago, the D.C. Circuit took a step toward silencing those critics by rejecting en banc a constitutional challenge to the CFPB’s structure.[2] But in another twist, two weeks ago news broke that the issue may remain unsettled, because in Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, U.S. District Judge Loretta Preska of the Southern District of New York explicitly rejected the PHH majority opinion and held the CFPB’s structure to be unconstitutional.[3] As discussed below, the new split of authority raises interesting questions going forward.

The SDNY Ruling

In RD Legal Funding, the defendant companies had offered cash advances to consumers waiting for settlement payouts. The CFPB and the New York Attorney General (the “NYAG”) alleged that these transactions were not sales transactions but loans and that these loans were made in violation of certain provisions of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (the “CFPA” or the “Act”).[4] Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on three grounds, including that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured and therefore lacks authority to bring claims under the CFPA.[5]

By Adam G. Unikowsky and Leonard R. Powell

On June 21, 2018, the US Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., No. 17-494.  In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the Dormant Commerce Clause does not bar a state from requiring an out-of-state seller lacking in-state physical presence to collect and remit sales tax.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court took the unusual step of overruling two of its own prior opinions: National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).  The Court held that stare decisis was an insufficient basis to uphold a rule it viewed as anachronistic, particularly in light of the explosive growth of e-commerce.

Wayfair is a major victory for states, who can now collect tax from out-of-state sellers and brick-and-mortar retailers, subjecting the latter to the same tax burdens as their online competitors.  Wayfair, however, does not hold that all tax regimes will pass constitutional muster.  To the contrary, it holds that such regimes will be subject to traditional Dormant Commerce Clause doctrines designed to prevent undue burdens on interstate commerce.

Background

Wayfair's issue was one the Court had decided twice before.  In Bellas Hess, the Court held that states could not impose sales tax collection obligations on out-of-state sellers who relied solely on the mail and common carriers to deliver their goods because the sellers “lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the State required by both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.”  In Quill, the Court overruled Bellas Hess’s due process holding, but reaffirmed Bellas Hess’s holding that the Dormant Commerce Clause forbids the imposition of sales tax collection obligations on sellers lacking an in-state physical presence.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, emphasized that his vote was based solely on stare decisis.

By Meenakshi Krishnan

On Monday, June 19, the Supreme Court held 8-1 in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County that California courts lacked specific jurisdiction to entertain claims brought by plaintiffs who were not California residents, as there was an insufficient connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue. 

In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., a group of plaintiffs—86 California residents and 592 residents from other states—filed several state law claims in California Superior Court, alleging health damage caused by Plavix, a drug manufactured and sold by Bristol-Myers. The nonresident plaintiffs did not claim that they procured Plavix through any California source, nor did they claim they were injured or treated for their injuries in California. Bristol-Myers did not develop, market, manufacture, or otherwise work on Plavix in California, though the drug was sold in the state. Bristol-Myers asserted lack of personal jurisdiction, and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the California Court of Appeal held that California courts had specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims. The California Supreme Court affirmed, applying a “sliding scale approach to specific jurisdiction.” Under that approach, “the more wide ranging the defendant’s forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts and the claim.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the California courts’ exercise of jurisdiction in this case violated the Due Process Clause and subsequently reversed and remanded.

By Alexander M. Smith

This morning, the Supreme Court held 8-0 in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker that the named plaintiffs in a class action cannot appeal a denial of class certification (or the granting of a motion to strike class allegations) by voluntarily dismissing their claims.  A five-Justice majority held that this tactic was barred because a voluntary dismissal under these circumstances does not constitute a “final order” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, while three Justices concurred in the judgment on the basis that such a voluntary dismissal extinguishes the adversity necessary to give rise to Article III standing.  (The Consumer Law Roundup has covered Baker in three previous posts.) 

In Baker, the plaintiffs had filed a putative class action against Microsoft alleging that a defect in the Xbox 360 resulted in scratched discs.  After the district court granted Microsoft’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ class allegations, the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against Microsoft so that there would be a “final decision” from which they could appeal the denial of class certification.  The Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, that a stipulated dismissal of an individual claim is an adverse and appealable final judgment.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this jurisdictional issue and subsequently reversed.

By Reena R. Bajowala

A federal court in Chicago recently dismissed a lawsuit brought by Dale Sabo, an Illinois resident seeking to represent a multi-state class of consumers who bought defendant Wellpet LLC’s pet food products. Sabo alleged that the products were falsely labeled “Made in the USA,” but instead contain vitamins and minerals sourced from outside the United States in violation of Illinois, California, New York and six other state consumer fraud statutes.  Sabo alleged that he places a premium on American-made products and is willing to pay more for them.  In addition, he claims that a majority of Americans feel the same way, particularly given recent reports of recalls linked to foreign-sourced ingredients. 

To prevail on a consumer fraud claim, though, a plaintiff must plead actual damages, i.e., actual pecuniary loss.  The court found that plaintiff failed to do so. While Sabo alleged that he “paid more for the products than they were actually worth,” the court held that he failed to provide the factual foundation “to moor his subjective estimation of the products’ worth.”  Neither did he allege that products that lacked domestic-source designations were less expensive.  As a result, “while he alleges that he (and other consumers) are willing to pay a premium for goods made in the United States, he stops short of alleging that he in fact paid more for defendant’s . . . American-made” products.  Because the damages allegation was too speculative, the Court dismissed the lawsuit.

Sabo v. Wellpet, LLC, 2017 WL 1427057, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2017). 

By Leonard R. Powell

On March 29, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that a New York law prohibiting sellers from “impos[ing] a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card” was a regulation of speech—not conduct—but the Court remanded the case to the Second Circuit to determine whether the speech regulation survives First Amendment scrutiny.

Regulation of credit card “surcharges” and cash “discounts” dates back to the 1970s and 1980s. In 1974, Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to, inter alia, “prohibit[] card issuers from contractually preventing merchants from giving discounts to customers who paid in cash.” In 1976, Congress further added to TILA a ban on card surcharges. However, the existence of opposing bans demanded a method for distinguishing between them. By 1981, Congress had defined “discount” as “a reduction made from the regular price,” “surcharge” as “any means of increasing the regular price to a cardholder which is not imposed upon customers paying by cash, check, or similar means,” and “regular price” as (1) the “tagged or posted” price when only a single price is posted, or (2) the price charged to card users when either no price is posted or two prices (both a cash price and a credit card price) are posted. Despite the complicated nature of this statutory framework, the bottom line was simple: “a merchant could violate the surcharge ban only by posting a single price and charging credit card users more than that posted price.”

By Jill M. Hutchison

The Supreme Court recently declined to wade into a developing circuit split on the question of just what constitutes an ascertainable class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) class. In the case of many consumer products, particularly those that are consumable, like food, cosmetics, and supplements, the defendant is unlikely to have records to document individual customers’ purchases, and the consumers are unlikely to have kept receipts. In such cases, some court have permitted class members to self-identify by affidavit and have held that this identification method is acceptable to create an ascertainable class.

By Jeremy M. Creelan

On January 29, 2016, U.S. District Judge David Hurd in the Northern District of New York ordered Greek Yogurt maker Chobani to end its recent advertisements negatively referencing the products of its biggest competitors, Yoplait (General Mills) and Dannon.

Chobani’s series of advertisements that began running in early January 2016 advertised their “Chobani Simply 100 Greek Yogurt,” which has “100 calories per serving with no preservatives or artificial ingredients.” In one of the advertisements, a woman reads the ingredients on a cup of Yoplait Greek 100 Yogurt while a voice is heard saying, "Potassium sorbate? Really? That stuff is used to kill bugs." In another advertisement, a woman throws a container of Dannon’s Light and Fit into a trash can as a voiceover questions, "Sucralose? Why? That stuff has chlorine added to it."  As found by the court, sucralose is an artificial sweetener and potassium sorbate is preservative that prevents yeast and mold growth; both are used in many food products and they have been found safe by the federal government.

By Mara Ludmer and Kelly M. Morrison

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mazza v. American Honda appeared to be an instant game changer, providing defendants across the Circuit with an easy way to oppose certification of nationwide classes seeking remedies under California consumer protection laws.  The plaintiffs in Mazza alleged that Honda had misrepresented the safety features of its Acura vehicles in brochures, television commercials, and print advertisements.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had “erroneously concluded that California law could be applied to the entire nationwide class.”  And “[b]ecause the law of multiple jurisdictions” would apply to “any nationwide class of purchasers,” the Ninth Circuit held that “variances in state law [would] overwhelm common issues and preclude predominance for a single nationwide class.” 

By Howard S. Suskin

The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari to address whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction under both Article III and 28 U.S.C. §1291 to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their individual claims with prejudice.   Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, No. 15-457 (cert. granted Jan. 15, 2016).  In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit held that a stipulated dismissal of an individual claim is an adverse and appealable final judgment and that the plaintiffs did not lose their ability to appeal from a stipulated dismissal with prejudice of their lawsuit and from the order striking their class allegations.  A link to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is available here.