Decisions of Note Feed

CFPB Warns Digital Marketers, Loops In State AGs

By Jacob D. Alderdice and Michael W. Ross

In a recent interpretive rule announced on August 10, 2022,—and unveiled at a summit of the National Association of Attorneys General—the CFPB stated that digital marketers are subject to the CFPB’s jurisdiction, and expressly warned that it may take enforcement action against these entities. Such enforcement is likely to concern anti-discrimination provisions, and the new rule notes that State Attorneys General have jurisdiction to enforce these rules as well.

Prior to the CFPB’s August 10 rule, digital marketers—companies that market to consumers through social media, websites, and other online and digital channels—may have considered themselves outside the reach of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA), which provides that an entity is not a covered “service provider” if it provides “time or space” for an advertisement for a consumer financial product or service through print, television, or electronic media.

In its new interpretive rule, however, the CFPB announced that it believes digital marketers are not exempt if they are “materially involved” in the development of a “content strategy” for the marketing of financial products, and thus are covered service providers under the CFPA. The CFPB noted the evolution of modern digital ad targeting, describing how instead of just providing a forum for an ad, digital marketers are increasingly involved in the selection of prospective customers or the placement of content to affect consumer behavior, often based on the gathering of consumer data. Whereas the former practices would not be covered, the CFPB contends that the latter are more similar to conduct that would typically be performed by persons covered by the CFPA. The rule singled out practices such as lead generation, customer acquisition, and other marketing analysis or strategy using data and technology, as amounting to “material” involvement and thus covered behavior.

The new rule is a signal that the CFPB will be increasing enforcement in this area. In its accompanying press release, it described the new rule as a “warning” to digital marketing providers, and CFPB Director Rohit Chopra stated, “When Big Tech firms use sophisticated behavioral targeting techniques to market financial products, they must adhere to federal consumer protection laws. . . . Federal and state law enforcers can and should hold these firms accountable if they break the law.” In his remarks at the rule’s unveiling, Chopra also encouraged state attorneys general to pursue claims under the Consumer Financial Protection Act for any misconduct involving consumer financial products or services, including as to digital marketers.

The rule’s reference to “state law enforcers” is notable. The rule was first unveiled by Director Chopra during a summit of the National Association of Attorneys General, on consumer protection in the digital world. In his prepared remarks, Chopra emphasized the “role of state enforcers in policing unlawful conduct at the intersection of consumer finance and digital marketing.” The interpretive rule notes state AG jurisdiction, and the CFPB has stated previously that state enforcement authorities also have jurisdiction to enforce the CFPA.

Substantively, a stated purpose of this effort by the CFPB is to address discrimination, which the CFPB has raised as a concern with regard to AI and machine learning. The new rule warns that the UDAAP provision (unfair, deceptive and abusive acts/practices) will be used to combat the use of protected characteristics to make marketing decisions (i.e. digital redlining).

The CFPB has taken other actions directed towards discrimination more broadly. It recently updated its Examination Manual to include discrimination as a part of UDAAP, and the agency is currently litigating the reach of ECOA (Equal Credit Opportunity Act) to digital marketing. In July 2019, we publicly highlighted the use of UDAAP and similar authority as a basis for enforcement actions alleging discrimination in the use of digital tools. 

Companies involved in digital marketing should review the new interpretive guidance carefully, re-review their practices to consider whether they may be potentially subject to enforcement action at the state or federal level, and be on the lookout for any potential challenges to the new rule.


US Supreme Court Issues Significant Ruling Limiting the “Look-Through” Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Under the Federal Arbitration Act

By: Laura P. MacDonald, Elizabeth A. Edmondson, and Adina Hemley-Bronstein

On March 31, 2022, the US Supreme Court issued a significant decision in Badgerow v. Walters, No. 20-1143, ending a circuit split about when federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to review domestic arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In an 8-1 opinion, the Court ruled that federal courts cannot “look through” to the underlying controversy to establish subject matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitral award under the FAA. As a result, absent diversity of citizenship, petitioners seeking to confirm or vacate domestic arbitration awards under the FAA must now bring those petitions in state court.

The FAA governs the enforcement of most arbitration agreements in the United States. The statute dictates the standards for compelling arbitration (under Section 4) and for the confirmation or vacatur of an arbitration award (under Sections 9 and 10). But, although the FAA authorizes a party to make these petitions, the statute does not automatically authorize federal courts to hear them. This is because the FAA, unlike almost all federal statutes, does not itself confer federal subject matter jurisdiction, at least for domestic arbitration agreements. Instead, for a federal court to decide a petition under the FAA, the court must have an “independent jurisdictional basis.” Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008). (Section 2 of the FAA confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over “non-domestic arbitrations,” i.e., those that have at least one foreign party or a substantial international nexus.)

The issue before the Court in Badgerow was whether a federal court may determine its jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award only by looking at the face of the petition for judicial review, or whether it may “look through” the petition and examine whether federal jurisdiction would exist over the underlying dispute. The Court had previously authorized look-through jurisdiction in the context of petitions to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA, see Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), but a circuit split had emerged regarding whether the same approach applied to petitions to confirm or vacate under Sections 9 and 10. Whereas the Third and Seventh Circuits maintained that Vaden should be confined to petitions to compel under Section 4, the Second Circuit, along with the First and Fourth, applied look-through jurisdiction to other petitions brought under the FAA. This means that until now, the Second Circuit has permitted federal court access for many petitioners seeking review of arbitration awards in New York, where a significant number of the nation’s arbitrations take place.

The case arose from an employment arbitration. The petitioner Denise Badgerow brought state and federal claims against her former employer for unlawful termination. After the arbitrators dismissed her claims, Badgerow filed suit in Louisiana state court to vacate the decision, arguing that fraud had taken place during the arbitration proceeding. In response, Badgerow’s employer removed the action to federal district court and petitioned the court to confirm the arbitration award. Badgerow then moved to remand, arguing that the federal district court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction needed to confirm or vacate the award under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA. The district court applied Vaden’s look-through approach and held that, because the underlying employment dispute involved federal-law claims, it could therefore exercise jurisdiction over the employer’s petition to review and confirm the award. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, joining the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits in extending the look-through approach to additional petitions under the FAA.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Resolving the existing circuit split, it held that the look-through approach applicable under Section 4 does not apply to petitions to confirm or vacate arbitration awards under Sections 9 and 10. Thus, jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award must be apparent on the face of the petition itself and independent of the underlying dispute. The Court reasoned that Sections 9 and 10 “contain none of the statutory language on which Vaden relied” and “[m]ost notably” lacked “Section 4’s ‘save for’ clause.” Unlike Section 4, Sections 9 and 10 “do not instruct a court to imagine a world without an arbitration agreement, and to ask whether it would then have jurisdiction over the parties dispute.” In fact, the Court pointed out, “Sections 9 and 10 do not mention the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction at all.” Applying standard principles of statutory interpretation, the Court reasoned that while “Congress could have replicated Section 4’s look-through instructions in Sections 9 and 10,” it did not, leading to the Court’s conclusion that federal courts may determine their jurisdiction only by assessing the parties’ petitions to confirm or vacate and not by looking through to the underlying controversy.

Following Badgerow, parties seeking to confirm or challenge arbitration awards in federal court will need to show that a federal question exists on the face of the petition itself. In practice, parties will have to show that either (a) the arbitration agreement is “non-domestic” and thus eligible for federal jurisdiction under Section 2, (b) federal diversity jurisdiction exists over the dispute, or (c) the confirmation action receives pendent jurisdiction due to the presence of a separate and independent federal claim.

The Court’s decision in Badgerow will likely shift a substantial number of confirmation and vacatur actions to state courts. While the FAA will remain the governing law, the shift to state court will require practitioners to follow state procedural rules and will potentially introduce questions about how state arbitration law can fill any gaps in the FAA itself.


Supreme Court Limits Article III Standing for Class Action Plaintiffs: Implications for Data Breach Class Actions

   

By: Clifford W. BerlowAlexander E. Cottingham, and Lindsay C. Harrison

SCOTUSIntroduction

On June 25, 2021, the US Supreme Court in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez[1] narrowed the scope of Article III standing for plaintiffs who allege the violation of a statute but cannot show they otherwise suffered harm. Though decided in the context of a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) class action, the decision has major implications for parties litigating state and federal statutory claims of all varieties in federal courts. In particular, TransUnion seems poised to limit the viability of class actions arising from data breaches. The decision likely means, for example, that plaintiffs lack Article III standing when their information may have been accessed but was not misused in a manner causing concrete harm—a subject on which the courts of appeals previously had split. The decision also will limit plaintiffs’ ability to assert Article III standing merely based on the violation of privacy statutes alone without any resulting harm. 

Defendants litigating data breach class actions can take advantage of this new precedent in federal court to seek dismissal of data breach class actions for lack of Article III standing. But doing so is not without consequence. If federal courts are not available to adjudicate these claims, plaintiffs likely will pursue them in state courts, where standing precedent may be more lenient for plaintiffs. Defendants thus will need to be strategic about how aggressively they pursue TransUnion-based dismissals.

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COVID-19 / Coronavirus

We are closely tracking and providing information on developments facing companies and organizations arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. In the latest alerts, our lawyers offer guidance on financial and tax relief provisions in Illinois; share observations of how landlords and real estate lenders are Noun_virus_1772453responding to defaulting tenants and borrowers; consider the effects of the crisis on M&A transactions; explore how social distancing affects ongoing environmental investigations and mediation; analyze how state and federal legislation may combat insurance coverage denials for COVID-19; and examine the Department of Labor’s guidance regarding expanded family and medical leave under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act. These alerts and others are available in the library of our COVID-19 / Coronavirus Resource Center

 


Second Circuit Asks: Will New York Recognize Cross-Jurisdictional Class Action Tolling?

 

By: Gabriel K. Gillett and Katherine Rosoff

Banana plantationOn August 7, 2019 the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals with broad implications for multi-jurisdictional class actions.  First, “whether New York recognizes ‘cross-jurisdictional class action tolling,’ i.e., tolling of a New York statute of limitations by the pendency of a class action in another jurisdiction.”  Chavez v. Occidental Chem. Corp., -- F.3d. --, 2019 WL 3673190, *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 7, 2019).  Second, “whether non-merits dismissal of class certification can terminate class action tolling” when dismissal included a “return jurisdiction” clause allowing the plaintiffs to renew their claims if they were unable to find an adequate forum in their home countries.  Id. 

The case was brought by agricultural workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador and Panama, alleging they suffered adverse health effects from a pesticide used on banana plantations.  The parties agree that their claims accrued no later than August 1993 and are subject to New York’s 3-year statute of limitations in personal injury actions.  However, the parties dispute whether plaintiffs’ claims were tolled by related actions filed in other jurisdictions.

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Second Circuit Creates Split on Investment Company Act Private Right of Action

 

By: Gabriel K. Gillett and Howard S. Suskin

New-Development-IconIn a decision issued on August 5, 2019, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit created a split with other courts, including the Third Circuit, on the issue of whether there is a private right of action for rescission under the Investment Company Act (ICA).  The Second Circuit held that, based on the text of the statute and its legislative history, “ICA § 47(b)(2) creates an implied private right of action for a party to a contract that violates the ICA to seek rescission of that violative contract.”  Oxford University Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder Inc., No. 16-4061 (2d Cir. Aug. 5, 2019), Slip op. 23.  In so holding, the court acknowledged that it was creating a circuit split:

We note that the Third Circuit and several lower courts have reached the opposite result.  In Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2012), the Third Circuit found plaintiffs lacked a private right of action to seek rescission under § 47(b).  Plaintiffs in Santomenno alleged violations of ICA § 26(f), which makes it unlawful to pay ‘fees and charges’ on certain insurance contracts that exceed what is ‘reasonable,’ id. at 187, and sought rescission (in addition to monetary damages).  The court in Santomenno found that plaintiffs did not have a cause of action.  We do not find the reasoning in Santomenno persuasive. 

Slip op. 21-22.

Litigators should watch to see how other courts weigh in, and whether the Supreme Court ultimately takes up the issue to resolve the split.

Gabriel Gillett is an Associate in Jenner & Block’s Appellate & Supreme Court Practice in Chicago.   Howard Suskin is a Partner and Co-Chair of the Securities Litigation Practice Group at the firm.


The CFPB Rolls Out New Regulations for Debt Collection

By Amy Egerton-Wiley

CallDebt collectors have for years sought guidance on how and when digital messages could be sent to contact consumers.  On Tuesday, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) announced a notice of proposed debt collection regulations that would provide that guidance.  The new regulations would expand the potential avenues by which debt collectors could contact consumers and would establish a host of other regulations that would alter debt collection practices.  The proposed rulemaking announced by the CFPB is more than 500-pages long and would be the first substantive rules to interpret the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which regulates the debt collection industry. 

The CFPB identified several main highlights that the proposed rulemaking would achieve, including establishing a bright-line rule limiting call attempts and telephone conversations, clarifying consumer protection requirements for certain consumer-facing debt collection disclosures, clarifying how debt collectors can communicate with consumers, prohibiting suits on time barred debts, and requiring communication before credit reporting. 

The new regulations would allow debt collectors to expand methods of communicating with consumers, such as exploring WhatsApp or other online models.  They also, however, restrict the abilities of debt collectors to contact consumers.  For example, the proposed rules would cap the number of times a debt collector could call a consumer to seven times in one week, and once the debt collector reached the consumer, it would not be able to contact the individual again for another week.  The bureau cited increased clarity and modernizing the legal regime as its goal for the new regulations. 

The CFPB’s statement and proposed rules can be found here.


US Supreme Court Holds that Classwide Arbitration is Unavailable Unless the Parties Clearly Agree to It

   

By: Michael T. BrodyGabriel K. GillettHoward S. Suskin and Adam G. Unikowsky

Supreme Court Pillars - iStock_000017257808LargeOn April 24, 2019, the US Supreme Court issued its decision in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, No. 17-988, holding that classwide arbitration is not available unless clearly authorized by the parties.[1]  In a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court reasoned that when an arbitration agreement is ambiguous or silent about classwide arbitration, the parties have not actually agreed to it.[2]  As a result, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not allow a party to be forced into classwide arbitration based on an ambiguous agreement, even if state-law contract interpretation principles would construe ambiguity against the agreement’s drafter.[3]

Lamps Plus is just the latest in a long string of victories for arbitration advocates.  Building on prior decisions rejecting classwide arbitration in the consumer and employment contexts, the Court has now suggested that classwide arbitration is presumptively unavailable and that a clear expression of intent is required to overcome that presumption.  The practical result is that classwide arbitration may only be available against corporate defendants that specifically subject themselves to it.  And that may be a null (or very small) set, at least for companies that take the majority opinion’s view that classwide arbitration “‘sacrifices the principal ad­vantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slow­er, more costly and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.’”[4]

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En Banc Ninth Circuit Rejects Compelled Commercial Speech Ordinance on First Amendment Ground

By Gabriel K. Gillett

Beverage1Last week the en banc Ninth Circuit unanimously struck down San Francisco’s ordinance requiring warnings on ads for certain sugary beverages as a violation of the First Amendment.  In American Beverage Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 16-16072, the court held that the Ordinance is an “unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirement[] [that] might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  (Jenner & Block filed an amicus brief in the case, on behalf of the Retail Litigation Center.) 

Four of the eleven judges who participated joined three special concurrences, however, explaining why they believed the majority had erred even though it reached the right result.  Those three concurrences highlight a number of issues related to commercial speech for courts to address in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).   
 

San Francisco’s “Sugar-Sweetened Beverage” Ordinance

The American Beverage Association v. City and County of San Francisco centers on a 2015 ordinance that required ads for certain “Sugar-Sweetened Beverages” to include the following:  “WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay. This is a message from the City and County of San Francisco.”  Slip op. 8.

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SDNY Extends RD Legal Funding Dismissal to the NYAG; CFPB Appeals

By Nicolas G. Keller

new updateOn September 12, 2018, Judge Loretta Preska of the District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the New York State Attorney General’s (“NYAG”) suit against RD Legal Funding, LLC, and related entities (collectively, “RD Entities”)[1] for allegedly defrauding individuals awaiting payouts from two separate funds—the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2011 (“VCF”) and the fund arising out of the NFL Concussion Litigation Settlement Agreement (“NFL Fund”).[2] The Court’s ruling demonstrates the potentially far-reaching implications of the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure in terms of not only the CFPB’s enforcement actions but also those of state actors. 

The lawsuit, commenced jointly by the NYAG and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) in February 2017, alleges that the defendants’ transactions with individuals that the defendants characterized as “purchases” or “assignments” of VCF or NFL Fund payouts are substantively high-interest loans.[3] The CFPB and the NYAG assert that the alleged loans are usurious and violate provisions of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”)—also known as Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act—and various New York state fraud and usury laws.[4]

Nearly three months ago, on June 21, the Court dismissed the CFPB from the suit.[5] The gist of the Court’s holding, which we wrote more about here, was that the CFPB’s structure as an independent agency headed by a single director who can be removed by the President only for cause violates separation of powers.[6]  And the Court ruled that the remedy for this constitutional infirmity is to strike the CFPA in its entirety, thereby leaving the CFPB without the authority to bring suit.[7]  The Court also noted that:

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