By: Alexander M. Smith

On February 9, 2021, the Ninth Circuit—in a split decision with a spirited dissent—reversed the dismissal of a consumer class action challenging P.F. Chang’s’s use of the phrase “krab mix” to describe sushi rolls that contain no real crab. Although Kang is an unpublished case and breaks little new legal ground, the two opinions offer a useful glimpse into how both defendants and plaintiffs frame their positions in false advertising lawsuits, and they highlight how easily judges can come to radically different conclusions in consumer class actions, even when faced with the same facts and law.

In Kang, the plaintiff alleged that P.F. Chang’s’s sushi rolls were deceptively labeled because they purported to contain “krab mix,” but did not include any crab at all. Judge Anderson of the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit, holding that no reasonable consumer would be deceived into believing that “krab mix” contained crab. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Judge Friedland and Judge Watford—writing for the panel majority—emphasized that “determining whether reasonable consumers are likely to be deceived will usually be a question of fact not appropriate on a motion to dismiss.” Applying this standard, the panel majority concluded that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged that the “inclusion of the term ‘krab mix’ in the ingredient list for certain of its sushi rolls is likely to deceive reasonable consumers into thinking that the sushi rolls contain at least some real crab meat when in fact they contain none.” Although P.F. Chang’s offered several reasons that this interpretation was implausible, the panel majority rejected them all:

• The panel majority rejected P.F. Chang’s’s argument that the “fanciful” term “krab mix” suggested the absence of real crab. Although the panel majority agreed that “reasonable consumers confronted with the fanciful spelling of ‘krab’ on the menu would not assume they were purchasing a sushi roll with 100% real crab meat,” it nonetheless concluded that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged that the term “krab mix” suggests that the product contains “a mixture of imitation and real crab.” In contrast to cases where the challenged term has a specific, widely-understood meaning (such as “diet” soft drinks), the panel majority held that “there is no prevailing understanding that listing ‘krab mix’ as an ingredient in a sushi roll signifies that the item contains no real crab meat.” And in contrast to a case where the “fanciful” term appears in the name of the product (such as “Froot Loops”), the panel majority concluded that the term was at least plausibly misleading because it appeared in the ingredient list.

By: Alexander M. Smith

In 2017, several plaintiffs began bringing lawsuits in California and New York premised on the theory that “diet” sodas — i.e., sodas sweetened with zero-calorie artificial sweeteners rather than sugar — were mislabeled because the sodas falsely suggested they would help consumers lose weight, even though aspartame and other artificial sweeteners are supposedly associated with weight gain.  Courts have routinely dismissed these lawsuits on one of two grounds:

• Some courts have concluded that this theory of deception is implausible because reasonable consumers understand the term “diet” to mean that the soda has zero calories, not that it will help them lose weight.  See, e.g., Geffner v. Coca-Cola Co., 928 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he “diet” label refers specifically to the drink’s low caloric content; it does not convey a more general weight loss promise.”); Becerra v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 17-5916, 2018 WL 1070823, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (“Reasonable consumers would understand that Diet Coke merely deletes the calories usually present in regular Coke, and that the caloric reduction will lead to weight loss only as part of an overall sensible diet and exercise regimen dependent on individual metabolism.”). 

• Other courts have dismissed these lawsuits on the basis that the scientific literature cited by the plaintiffs does not support a causal relationship between zero-calorie sweeteners and weight gain.  See, e.g., Excevarria v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., 764 F. App’x 108, 110 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of lawsuit challenging labeling of Diet Dr. Pepper, as “[n]one of the studies cited . . . establish a causal relationship between aspartame and weight gain”).

The Ninth Circuit recently joined the chorus of courts that have rejected this theory of deception.  In Becerra v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., the district court dismissed a lawsuit alleging that Diet Dr. Pepper was mislabeled as a “diet” soda, both because the plaintiff had not alleged that consumers construed the term “diet” as a representation about weight loss and because the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that aspartame is associated with weight gain.  On December 30, 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued a published decision affirming the dismissal of this lawsuit.  Becerra v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up, Inc. --- F.3d ----, 2019 WL 7287554 (9th Cir. 2019).

By: Alexander M. Smith

Earlier this month, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) released the latest iteration of its Supervisory Highlights report, which summarizes some of the CFPB’s recent supervisory examinations and provides guidance to industry about practices to avoid.  The CFPB’s Supervisory Highlights report notes that the CFPB has recently examined the following practices:

• Automobile Loan Servicing.  The CFPB has recently conducted examinations of captive automotive finance companies for unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAAPs) involving rebates for extended automobile warranties.  Typically, when a lessee purchases an extended warranty for a leased car and the car is a total loss, the lessee is entitled to a pro-rated rebate of the premium amount for the un-used portion of the warranty; the rebate is applied first to any deficiency balance on the lease, and the balance is returned to the lessee.  The CFPB found that some automotive finance companies had engaged in UDAAPs by (1) failing to apply the rebate to the deficiency balance or artificially deflating the value of the rebate (for instance, by overstating the number of miles on the car) and then (2) attempting to collect on the inflated deficiency balance.

By Alexander M. Smith

Last week, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced the Consumer Right to Know Act (“Act”) as part of his proposed executive budget.  The Act would authorize the New York Department of Environmental Conservation, along with the New York Department of Health and the New York Department of State, to promulgate regulations requiring product manufacturers to disclose the presence of potentially hazardous substances on their product labeling.  Among other things, the Act would require these agencies to assess the feasibility of on-package labeling; develop regulations establishing a labeling requirement for designated products; develop a list of more than 1,000 substances that must be labeled; and identify the types of consumer products that will be subject to these new labeling requirements.  The Act would also extend the Department of Environmental Conservation’s disclosure requirements for household cleaning products to encompass all cleaning products sold in New York, and it would empower the Department of Health to require similar disclosures for personal care products like shampoo, deodorant, or baby powder.  Needless to say, these disclosure requirements would be among the most stringent—if not the most stringent—in the United States. 

Governor Cuomo’s announcement is available here.  We will keep our readers updated on the progress of Governor Cuomo’s proposal. 

By Alexander M. Smith

The Supreme Court’s next term kicks off next week, when the court re-convenes for its first oral argument since last April.  The docket currently features four cases of interest to the consumer law and class action bar:

• In Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit construed a provision stating that “arbitration shall be in lieu of any and all lawsuits or other civil legal proceedings relating to my employment” to authorize class arbitration, even though the plaintiff’s employment agreement with Lamps Plus did not expressly authorize class-wide arbitration.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act “forecloses a state-law interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would authorize class arbitration based solely on general language commonly used in arbitration agreements.” 

• In Frank v. Gaos, the district court authorized a class-wide settlement of a lawsuit alleging that Google violated federal and state privacy laws by disclosing users’ search terms to third parties, even though the settlement consisted only of cy pres relief and attorneys' fees.  A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the objectors’ arguments that (1) a settlement that provided no direct relief to the class was inappropriate and (2) that the cy pres beneficiaries, which had previously received settlement funds from Google and which were affiliated with the law schools attended by class counsel, were improper.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “[w]hether, or in what circumstances, a cy pres award of class action proceeds that provides no direct relief to class members supports class certification and comports with the requirement that a settlement binding class members must be ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’”

By Alexander M. Smith

In the last three years, the Ninth Circuit and the California Court of Appeal have issued a pair of decisions clarifying that restitution under California’s consumer protection statutes is limited to the difference between the price a consumer paid for the product and the value the consumer received from that product—i.e., the “price premium” attributable to the defendant’s conduct.  See In re Tobacco Cases II, 240 Cal. App. 4th 779, 791-802 (2015); Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, 660 F. App’x 531, 534-35 (9th Cir. 2016).  Earlier this week, the Ninth Circuit continued this line of cases in Chowning v. Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc., which reaffirmed that “[t]he proper calculation of restitution . . . is price paid versus value received” and rejected a variety of alternative restitution models suggested by the plaintiff.  No. 16-56272, 2018 WL 3016908, at *1 (9th Cir. June 18, 2016). 

In Chowning, the plaintiff alleged that Kohl’s misled consumers by displaying alongside the sale price for its products an inflated “Actual Retail Price,” which was not the prevailing market retail price and which caused consumers to believe that they were receiving a larger discount than they were.  As a result, the plaintiff alleged that she and other putative class members were deceived into buying products that they would not have purchased but for Kohl’s misleading price comparisons.  In March 2016, Judge Klausner of the Central District of California granted Kohl’s motion for summary judgment.  He identified “three limiting principles” that defined the appropriate scope of restitution under California law: (1) that “restitution cannot be ordered exclusively for the purpose of deterrence”; (2) that any proposed method of restitution “must account for the benefits or value that a plaintiff received at the time of purchase”; and (3) that “the amount of restitution ordered must represent a measurable loss supported by the evidence.”  No. 15-8673, 2016 WL 1072129, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016). 

By Alexander M. Smith

Last October, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a final rule requiring payday lenders, automotive title lenders, deposit advance lenders, and similar short-term loan issuers to determine up front whether borrowers would have the ability to repay certain short-term, small dollar loans without borrowing again.  (The CFPB press release summarizing this rule is available here.)  On January 16, however, the CFPB announced that it would initiate additional rulemaking so that it could “reconsider” this rule.   Although the CFPB’s announcement did not repeal the rule, Law360 notes that many observers believe that the protections in the CFPB’s final rule will be “rolled back or eliminated altogether” and that other federal regulators, such as the Comptroller of the Currency, are considering amending their rules to expand the availability of similar small-dollar loans.   We will continue to monitor and report on the fate of the CFPB’s payday lending rule.

By Alexander M. Smith

Earlier this week, the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument in Roberts v. AT&T Mobility LLC (Case No. 16-16915).  In 2015, a putative class of consumers sued AT&T in the Northern District of California, alleging that AT&T misled consumers about its “unlimited” data plans by misrepresenting its data speeds and failing to disclose that it would “throttle” data after a certain point.  AT&T moved to compel arbitration, and the plaintiffs raised a novel argument in opposition: The Federal Arbitration Act violates the First Amendment because, as construed by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and its progeny, it denies consumers the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances.  In 2016, the district court (Chen, J.) rejected this argument.  The district court did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ Petition Clause argument; instead, it held as a threshold matter that the plaintiffs could not raise a constitutional challenge to the FAA because AT&T’s act of seeking to compel enforcement of an arbitration agreement did not constitute state action.  No. 15-3418, 2016 WL 1660049, at *4-10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2016).  The district court nonetheless noted that the application of the state action doctrine to this argument presented “novel and difficult questions of first impression” and accordingly certified an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the state action issue.  No. 15-3418, 2016 WL 3476099, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2016). 

Although the Ninth Circuit will likely take weeks (if not months) to issue its opinion, early coverage of the oral argument suggests that the plaintiffs’ argument may not fare well.  According to Law360, one of the judges on the panel inquired whether the plaintiffs were asking the court “to tell the Supreme Court in hindsight [that] the [J]ustices were wrong in their Concepcion ruling.”  We will update this post when the Ninth Circuit issues its ruling.

By Alexander M. Smith

Earlier this week, the Eighth Circuit reversed an order by the Western District of Arkansas (Holmes, J.) imposing sanctions on counsel who voluntarily dismissed a putative class action immediately before they re-filed the action and sought approval of a class settlement in Arkansas state court.  Although the district court concluded that counsel for the putative class stipulated to the dismissal for the “improper purpose of seeking a more favorable forum” and used “properly attached federal jurisdiction as a mid-litigation bargaining chip,” the Eighth Circuit found that counsel’s conduct was proper because “a reasonable lawyer would have had a colorable legal argument that a stipulation of voluntary dismissal . . . is permissible in a case in which the class has not yet been certified.” 

By Alexander M. Smith

This morning, the Supreme Court held 8-0 in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker that the named plaintiffs in a class action cannot appeal a denial of class certification (or the granting of a motion to strike class allegations) by voluntarily dismissing their claims.  A five-Justice majority held that this tactic was barred because a voluntary dismissal under these circumstances does not constitute a “final order” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, while three Justices concurred in the judgment on the basis that such a voluntary dismissal extinguishes the adversity necessary to give rise to Article III standing.  (The Consumer Law Roundup has covered Baker in three previous posts.) 

In Baker, the plaintiffs had filed a putative class action against Microsoft alleging that a defect in the Xbox 360 resulted in scratched discs.  After the district court granted Microsoft’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ class allegations, the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against Microsoft so that there would be a “final decision” from which they could appeal the denial of class certification.  The Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, that a stipulated dismissal of an individual claim is an adverse and appealable final judgment.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this jurisdictional issue and subsequently reversed.