By: Lee K. Van Voorhis and Eugene Lim

For the past forty years, the consumer welfare standard (CWS) was the consensus economic model that antitrust enforcement agencies used to determine whether a company’s behavior necessitates antitrust action.  The CWS became mainstream after former DC Circuit Justice Robert Bork published his exceedingly influential The Antitrust Paradox in 1978.^[1]  The book argued that antitrust laws were created to maximize consumers’ benefits, which meant focusing on surplus gains for consumers while disregarding efficiency gains for producers. The US Supreme Court quickly solidified Bork’s views in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.^[2]  The CWS has since provided more predictability in antitrust enforcement, narrowing its focus purely on consumer prices.^[3]

However, critics are now voicing concerns that it is time to broaden the factors analyzing what benefits consumers.  Critics have advocated that antitrust enforcement should be determined by a “total welfare standard" (TWS) instead.^[4]  Note that it is not clear whether the TWS is best for any particular political point of view.  On the one hand, the standard considers whether mergers could lead to higher unemployment, or harm the environment.  On the other hand, the standard would allow some mergers that result in higher prices to consumers, but have benefits that outweigh those higher prices.

In an article for Law360, Partners Daniel T. Fenske and Justin C. Steffen examine anti-competition issues with blockchain.  The authors explain that anti-competition issues abound now that financial institutions, corporations and other industries are investing in blockchain technology.  The issues, they observe, can be mitigated through early planning.  The authors discuss the “basics” of blockchain and anti-competition risks.  “The antitrust risks of blockchain technology will be clarified as the technology develops and it is put to more uses,” they conclude.  “It is critical that you consult competent antitrust counsel when structuring blockchain technology and policies so as to best mitigate antitrust risk.”

To read the full article, please click here.

By Kate T. Spelman

This post is intended to give readers a basic understanding of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).  This post is not intended to be a comprehensive review or recitation of the law.

Many litigators perceive state courts as more plaintiff-friendly than their federal counterparts.  As such, plaintiffs often prefer litigating class action lawsuits in state court, while defendants prefer removing these suits to federal court.

However, federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, as they can generally hear only two types of cases: (1) cases involving federal law (“federal question jurisdiction”), and (2) cases involving parties from different states where the amount in controversy exceeds